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This article shows that investors ﬁnancing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of
their ﬁnancial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition
for scarce informed capital at the reﬁnancing stage strengthens investors’ bargaining
positions. And yet, entrepreneurs’ incentives may be improved, because projects
funded by investors with ‘‘shallow pockets’’ must have not only a positive net present
value at the reﬁnancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio
projects. Our article may help understand provisions used in venture capital ﬁnance
that limit a fund’s initial capital and make it difﬁcult to add more capital once the
initial venture capital fund is raised. (JEL G24, G31)
Venture capital ﬁnance takes place in an environment of severe
informational asymmetries and incentive problems. Venture capitalists
not only must assess the quality of investment proposals submitted to
them for funding, but once the initial funding has taken place, they
must also give the right incentives to the entrepreneurs and monitor
the performance of the portfolio companies on an ongoing basis. This
article departs from most of the existing literature by explicitly recognizing
that venture capitalists manage a portfolio of projects. The need for
portfolio management arises if the amount of capital—both ﬁnancial
and human—available to a venture capital fund is limited, implying that
venture capitalists must carefully choose which projects to allocate their
scarce ﬁnancial and human resources to.1 By staging their investments,
venture capitalists retain the right to deny capital infusions to particular
projects in favor of other, more promising ones:
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1 As Silver (1985) writes, ‘‘the need for greater amounts of venture capital, frequently not cited in the
business plan, occurs sooner than expected. Because the Murphy’s law afﬂiction attacks most venture
capital portfolios, there arises a serious need for portfolio management.’’
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‘‘The most important mechanism for controlling the venture is staging
the infusion of capital. ...Capital is a scarceand expensiveresourcefor
individual ventures. ...The credible threat to abandon a venture, even
whentheﬁrmmightbeeconomicallyviable,isthekeytotherelationship
between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. ...The seemingly
irrational act of shutting down an economically viable entity is rational
when viewed from the perspective of the venture capitalist confronted
with allocating time and capital among various projects’’ (Sahlman
(1990)).
Allocating scarce resources to the mmost potent portfolio projects
implies that projects effectively compete with one another for limited
‘‘informed’’ capital at the reﬁnancing stage.2 As this naturally increases
venture capitalists’ ex post bargaining power, one would expect that
entrepreneurs’ ex ante incentives are reduced. As we will show, however,
the opposite may be true. While entrepreneurs’ expected payoff from a
given effort level is reduced (‘‘bargaining power effect’’), the difference
in expected payoffs across effort levels may be increased (‘‘competition
effect’’). Competition for scarce informed capital introduces an additional
incentive to have not only a positive net present value (NPV) at the
reﬁnancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio
projects. If the competition effect outweighs the bargaining power effect,
limiting the amount of informed capital can improve entrepreneurial
incentives.
This article compares ‘‘constrained ﬁnance’’ (or ‘‘shallow pock-
ets’’)—thatis,committingtoscarceinformedcapitaltoinducecompetition
amongentrepreneurs—with‘‘unconstrainedﬁnance’’(or‘‘deeppockets’’).
Constrained ﬁnance may improve entrepreneurial incentives, but it also
entails allocational inefﬁciencies, as successful projects may not obtain
capital at the reﬁnancing stage. Accordingly, constrained ﬁnance should
not be used for projects with a high ex ante likelihood of success. Indeed,
venture capitalists acknowledge that they ‘‘go for the home run’’ to offset
the large number of failures in their portfolios (Sahlman (1990), Bygrave
and Timmons (1992)).3
While our model focuses mainly on moral hazard, we show that
constrained ﬁnance may also have advantages in dealing with adverse
2 Reﬁnancing by uninformed outside investors is at best more costly, and at worst unavailable: ‘‘If the
originalpartnershipisunwillingtoarrangeforadditionalﬁnancing,itisunlikelythatanyotherpartnership
will choose to do so; the reluctance of the original partnership is a strong signal that the company is a poor
investment’’ (Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1995)). Consistent with this notion, Bruno and Tyebjee (1983)
ﬁnd that being denied follow-up ﬁnancing by a previous-round venture capitalist reduces a portfolio
company’s chances of obtaining ﬁnancing from outside investors by 74%. See Section 4.2 for a formal
analysis.
3 Sahlman (1990) reports the results of one survey of venture capital investments showing that 34.5% of
invested capital resulted in a loss, and another 30% resulted in returns in the low- to middle single digits.
Less than 7% of invested capital resulted in payoffs of more than ten times the original amount invested.
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selection problems. In particular, separation between good and bad
entrepreneurs may be impossible if investors have deep pockets, but
possible if investors can choose between deep and shallow pockets.
For certain parameter values, the unique equilibrium in our model is
a separating equilibrium in which good entrepreneurs choose constrained
ﬁnance and bad ones choose unconstrained ﬁnance.
Evidence from venture capital funds and the partnership agreements
governing them support the notion of competition for scarce ﬁnancial and
human capital among portfolio companies. As is well known, ‘‘venture
organizations will limit both how often they raise funds and the size
of the funds that they raise’’ (Gompers and Lerner (1996)). Moreover,
while venture capitalists raise a new fund every few years, partnership
agreements often include covenants preventing venture capitalists from
coinvesting in companies managed by other funds of the same venture
capitalist,implyingthatonceafundisraised,itcannotbeeasilyaugmented
by adding more capital (Sahlman (1990), Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995),
Gompers and Lerner (1996)).4 A fund’s human capital is also often
limited fom the outset: Partnership agreements often include covenants
that restrict the ability to add more general partners—that is, experienced
venturecapitalists—to an existingfund (Gompersand Lerner(1996)).5 As
aconsequence,venturecapitalistsmustcarefullychoosetowhichportfolio
companies they allocate their scarce ﬁnancial and human capital, leading
to precisely the sort of competition envisioned here.
Mostofthetheoreticalliteratureonventurecapitalﬁnanceconsidersthe
ﬁnancing of a single project. Exceptions are Kanniainen and Keuschnigg
(2003), Bernile, Cumming, and Lyandres (2005), and Fulghieri and Sevilir
(2005),whoallconsidertheoptimalspanofaventurecapitalist’sportfolio.
In contrast, holding the span of the venture capitalist’s portfolio ﬁxed,
we consider the beneﬁts and costs of venture capitalists being capital
constrained.




First, in our model, a potential disadvantage of constrained ﬁnance is
that it weakens entrepreneurs’ bargaining position, thus reducing their
incentives to exert effort. However, if entrepreneurs can be motivated to
4 Bartlett (1995) and Brooks (1999) provide discussions of venture partnership agreements.
5 This practice may seem peculiar at ﬁrst glance, but the motive stems from limited partners’ concerns that
‘‘by adding less experienced general partners, venture capitalists may reduce the burden on themselves’’
(Gompers and Lerner (1996)). Besides, it is not easy to ﬁnd skilled venture capitalists that can be added
to an existing fund: ‘‘[T]he skills needed for successful venture capital investing are difﬁcult and time-
consuming to acquire. During periods when the ...demand for venture capital has shifted, adjustments
in the number of venture capitalists ...take place very slowly’’ (Gompers and Lerner (1999)).
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exert high effort, because the competition effect outweighs the bargaining
power effect, then this disadvantage can become an advantage: Owing to
the investor’s stronger bargaining position, projects that would otherwise
notbeﬁnanciallyviablemaynowbecomeviable.Theideaofstrengthening
the bargaining position of the party whose contribution is more important
isanalyzedinseveralarticles,notablyGrossmanandHart(1986),Hartand
Moore (1990), Aghion and Tirole (1997), and—in a corporate ﬁnancing
context—Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein
(1994). In particular, Aghion and Bolton argue that strengthening the
position of investors may render projects ﬁnancially viable that might not
be viable otherwise.
Second, the idea that competition for scarce capital may increase
incentives to effort (‘‘competition effect’’) borrows from the labor tour-
nament literature (Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuff and Stiglitz
(1983)). There is one subtle qualiﬁcation: In many real-world tour-
naments, prizes are exogenously given; for example, there is only
one CEO position in a ﬁrm. In contrast, our model implies that
in a context of portfolio ﬁnancing, investors can provide optimal
incentives by carefully choosing the ratio of available capital to
projects.
Third, there is an obvious parallel to the literature on soft-budget
constraints, started by Kornai (1979, 1980) in the context of socialist
economies and applied by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) to ﬁnancial
commitmentproblems.Thereis,again,asubtlebutnoteworthydifference:
In Dewatripont and Maskin’s model, the role of hard budget constraints
is to deter bad entrepreneursfrom seeking ﬁnancing ex ante. In our model,
by contrast, the role of hard budget constraints, or shallow pockets,
is to credibly commit to a tournament to elicit greater entrepreneurial
effort.
The literature on internal capital markets also addresses issues similar
to those in this article. On the positive side, internal capital markets may
allow for an efﬁcient ex post reallocation of resources, commonly known
as ‘‘winner-picking’’ (Stein (1997), Matsusaka and Nanda (2002)).6 On
the negative side, the prospect of having resources reallocated away
may weaken division managers’ ex ante incentives (Brusco and Panunzi
(2005)).7 In our model, the positive and negative sides are reversed: Unlike
in an internal capital market, the ex post resource allocation is less efﬁcient
6 A distinct though somewhat related point is made by Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994), who argue
that assets from defaulting projects can be redeployed more efﬁciently in an internal capital market.
7 For related arguments, see Rotemberg and Saloner (1994), Gautier and Heider (2005), and Inderst and
Laux (2005). In contrast, in Stein’s (2002) model, managerial incentives to produce information may be
either weaker or stronger in a hierarchy.
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under constrained ﬁnance, while entrepreneurs’ ex ante incentives may be
improved.8
Finally, our article relates to the capital budgeting literature, notably
Harris and Raviv (1996, 1998). The authors show that imposing a
ﬁxed spending limit—which can be relaxed at the cost of a subsequent
audit—may be part of an optimal capital budgeting procedure. As in
our model, it may therefore be optimal to ration capital, even if doing
so means foregoing positive NPV investments. The reasons for doing so
are different, though. In Harris and Raviv’s models, capital rationing
induces truthful revelation of division managers’ private information. In
our model, capital rationing improves entrepreneurs’ ex ante incentives.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the
model. Section 2 examines the beneﬁts and costs of constrained ﬁnance
with respect to effort incentives. Section 3 considers the optimal choice
between constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance. Section 4 discusses the
role of ex ante and interim asymmetric information. Section 5 concludes.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
1. The Model
1.1 Agents and technology
There are two types of agents: entrepreneurs, who have no wealth, and
investors. Each entrepreneur has a project that requires an initial capital
outlay of I1 > 0a tt = 0. Projects can be reﬁnanced at t = 1a tc o s tI2 > 0.
Reﬁnancing is best understood as an expansion of the project. Projects
that are not reﬁnanced continue on a smaller scale in a sense made precise
below.9 At t = 2, each project generates a veriﬁable payoff of either R>0
or zero.
At t = 1, when the reﬁnancing decision is made, a project’s ‘‘interim
type’’ is ψ ∈ {n,l,h}, which is observed only by the investor and
entrepreneur. Projects with interim type ψ = n are failures and generate
a certain zero payoff. Projects with interim type ψ = l or ψ = h are
successful, implying that it is efﬁcient to reﬁnance them. If a project with
interim type ψ ∈ {l,h} is reﬁnanced, the probability that it generates R
is pψ,w h e r eph >p l, implying an expected payoff of Rψ := pψR.B y
contrast, if a project with interim type ψ ∈ {l,h} is not reﬁnanced, the
8 In winner-picking models ` a la Stein (1997), the amount of resources that can be allocated across projects
in an internal capital market is the same as under stand-alone ﬁnance. However, headquarters has the
authoritytoredistributeassetsfrom‘‘losers’’to‘‘winners,’’ whilestand-aloneﬁnancierslackthisauthority.
Hence, headquarters has advantages but no disadvantages. In contrast, in our model, constrained and
unconstrained investors have the same authority to reallocate resources, but constrained investors have
fewer resources available. Hence, in allocating resources, constrained investors have disadvantages but no
advantages.
9 While it is natural to think of I2 as ﬁnancial capital, it may alternatively represent human capital on the
part of the investor, who must expend time and resources to coach the project.




















Summary of Project Technology. In the ﬁgure, τ denotes the probability that the project is successful,
meaning it has interim type ϕ ∈{ l,h},a n d1 − τ denotes the probability that the project fails, meaning it
has interim type ϕ = n. Conditional on being successful, the probability that the project has interim type
ϕ = h (ϕ = l)i sqθ (1 − qθ), where θ ∈ {g,b} denotes the project’s ex ante type. A successful project that is
reﬁnanced (not reﬁnanced) generates an expected payoff of Rϕ (R0), while a project that fails generates a
certain zero payoff.
probability that it generates R is p0, implying an expected payoff of
R0 := p0R.10 Hence, the overall surplus from reﬁnancing a project with
interim type ψ ∈ {l,h} is rψ := Rψ − R0 − I2, which is positive, and where
rh >r l follows from our assumption that ph >p l.
With probability 1 − τ, the project’s interim type is ψ = n,a n dw i t h
probability τ, its interim type is either ψ = l or ψ = h. Conditional
on success, the probability of having interim type ψ = h is qθ,a n d
the probability of having interim type ψ = l is 1 − qθ,w h e r eθ ∈ {g,b}
represents the project’s ‘‘ex ante type.’’ Accordingly, the total probability
that the project has interim type ψ = h is τqθ, and the total probability
that it has interim type ψ = l is τ(1 − qθ). We assume that qg >q b,t h a ti s ,
good projects have a higher probability of becoming interim type ψ = h
than do bad projects. Figure 1 summarizes the project technology.
Weassumethatentrepreneurscanchoosetheirexantetypeatt = 0.This
choice is observed only by the entrepreneur (‘‘moral hazard’’). Choosing
ex ante type θ yields private beneﬁts Bθ at t = 2, where Bb = B>B g = 0.
Thesebeneﬁtsareobtainedonlyiftheprojectissuccessful.AsB constitutes
the opportunity cost of choosing θ = g instead of θ = b, we refer to B
10 That R0 does not depend on the project’s interim type simpliﬁes the analysis, but is not crucial.
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simplyas ‘‘effort cost’’andto theentrepreneur’schoiceofθ = g andθ = b
as ‘‘high effort’’ and ‘‘low effort’’, respectively. Finally, we assume that
(qg − qb)(rh − rl)>B , implying that high effort is socially efﬁcient.
1.2 Financing
Investors compete at t = 0 to provide ﬁnancing to entrepreneurs.
We specify that each investor optimally provides start-up ﬁnance to
two entrepreneurs.11 In principle, investors can raise enough capital
initially so that at t = 1 they are able to reﬁnance all projects that
are worth reﬁnancing. The central claim of this article, however, is
that investors may sometimes deliberately limit the amount of capital
raised to create competition among entrepreneurs at the reﬁnancing
stage. As noted in the Introduction, evidence from venture capital
funds and the partnership agreements governing them supports the
notion of competition for scarce ﬁnancial and human capital envisioned
here.
Ap r i o r i , it is not clear why the investor would not attempt to raise
additional capital at t = 1 if both projects turn out to be successful, and
we do not preclude the investor from trying to do so. However, as only the
(inside) investor and entrepreneur know the project’s interim type, there
exists a lemonsproblemvis-` a-vis outsideinvestorsthat may renderoutside
ﬁnancing infeasible, as in Rajan’s (1992) model. We relegate a formal
analysis of this issue to Section 4.2. For the time being, we assume that the
lemons problem at t = 1 is sufﬁciently strong to render outside ﬁnancing
infeasible.
The investor’s choice is between what we call unconstrained ﬁnance
(or ‘‘deep pockets’’) and constrained ﬁnance (or ‘‘shallow pockets’’).
This choice is observable by entrepreneurs. Under unconstrained ﬁnance,
the investor raises enough capital to potentially reﬁnance both portfolio
projects at t = 1, that is, she raises 2I1 + 2I2. Under constrained ﬁnance,
in contrast, the investor raises only 2I1 + I2 initially. Any capital currently
not used is invested in liquid securities, whose interest rate is normalized
to zero.
1.3 Contracts and renegotiations
Investors compete ex ante by offering contracts specifying for each
entrepreneur Ei as h a r esi of the project’s ﬁnal payoff. By restricting
ourselves to sharing rules, we rule out transfer payments to entrepreneurs
that are independent of the project’s payoff. The usual motivation for this
assumption is that guaranteed transfer payments independent of payoffs
wouldattractfraudulententrepreneurs,or‘‘ﬂy-by-nightoperators’’(Rajan
11 By managing more than two projects—the optimal span of the investor’s portfolio in our model—the
investor would spread herself too thin in the projects’ critical start-up phase.
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(1992)), who would only apply to cash in the guaranteed transfer
payment.12
Because the project’s interim type is nonveriﬁable, the reﬁnancing
decision cannot be part of an initial contract. Hence, whether the project
willbereﬁnancedmustbedeterminedbynegotiationsbetweentheinvestor
and entrepreneur at t = 1. As part of these negotiations, the two parties
mayrenegotiatetheinitialsharingrulesi,whichiswhyweshallusetheterm
renegotiations. But even though the initial sharing rule is renegotiated, it is
not meaningless: It deﬁnes the entrepreneur’s and investor’s payoffs if the
projectisnotreﬁnanced,andthustheiroutsideoptionsiftherenegotiations
break down. Where do the bargaining powers in the renegotiations stem
from? The entrepreneur’s bargaining power stems from his ability to
withdraw his inalienable and essential human capital, while the investor’s
bargaining power stems from her right to decide whether to reﬁnance.13
The assumption that the project’s interim type is nonveriﬁable is
important. It implies that the reﬁnancing decision cannot be part of
an initial contract, which in turn forces the investor and entrepreneur into
a bargaining situation at the reﬁnancing stage. Evidence from the venture
capital literature supports this assumption. Gompers (1995) writes: ‘‘Each
time capital is infused, contracts are written and negotiated ...Major
review of progress, due diligence, and the decision to continue funding
are generally done at the time of the reﬁnancing.’’ That contracts are
renegotiated at the reﬁnancing stage suggests that it might be difﬁcult
to specify ex ante what precisely ‘‘progress’’ means. Indeed, Gompers
(1995) rejects the alternative hypothesis of contingent follow-up ﬁnancing
based on observable ‘‘technology-driven milestones’’.14 Similarly, Kaplan
and Str¨ omberg (2003) write, ‘‘we consider a ﬁnancing round as a set of
contracts agreed to on a particular date that determines the disbursements
of funds from the VC to a company. A new ﬁnancing round differs from
the contingent release of funds in that the price and terms of the ﬁnancing
are not set in advance’’ (italics added).
12 Suppose there is a potentially large pool of such ﬂy-by-night operators—ex ante indistinguishable
from genuine entrepreneurs—who have projects generating a certain zero payoff. Knowing that they will
receiveaguaranteed payment,all of thoseoperatorswouldapply forﬁnancing, in which casetheinvestor’s
expectedproﬁtwouldquicklybecomenegative.Incontrast,underasharingrule,theﬂy-by-nightoperators
have nothing to gain from applying. Indeed, if there is an epsilon cost, they will strictly prefer not to apply.
13 Leaving the decision rights with regard to the reﬁnancing decision with the investor is optimal, given our
ﬂy-by-night operator assumption. If the entrepreneur had decision rights, a fraudulent entrepreneur could
extract a bribe at t = 1 by forcing the investor to invest I2 at the reﬁnancing stage, which is a negative
NPV undertaking, given that projects by ﬂy-by-night operators generate a certain zero payoff. The two
sides will thus strike a deal whereby the operator cedes his decision rights to the investor in return for a
bribe. Anticipating this bribe, all operators would apply for ﬁnancing.
14 Gompers (1995) writes: ‘‘Tangible assets may be easy to monitor without formal evaluation. A venture
capitalist can tell if a machine is still bolted to the ﬂoor. ...Conversations with practitioners, however,
indicate that they normally make continuation decisions when a new ﬁnancing round occurs. Venture
capitalists evaluate a ﬁrm based on performance progress, not whether a machine is still bolted down.’’
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2. Reﬁnancing and Renegotiations
Solving the model backwards, we ﬁrst consider the renegotiations at
t = 1. Subsequently,we derivethe entrepreneur’sexpectedpayoff at t = 0,
accounting for the outcome of the renegotiations. We then compute the
sensitivity of the entrepreneur’s expected payoff with respect to his ex ante
type. Comparing the sensitivities under unconstrained and constrained
ﬁnance, we ﬁnally obtain what we call the ‘‘responsiveness condition’’.
2.1 Renegotiations under unconstrained ﬁnance
Underunconstrainedﬁnance,theinvestorhassufﬁcientcapitaltoreﬁnance
all projects that are worth reﬁnancing. As a result, she cannot credibly
threaten not to reﬁnance a project with interim type ψ ∈ {l,h}, regardless
of the interim type of the other portfolio project. Consequently, the
reﬁnancing decision for a particular project is independent of the other
project, implying that we can analyze the renegotiations with each
entrepreneur separately.
Consider the renegotiations with entrepreneur Ei. Given that the
investor knows Ei’s interim type, renegotiations take place under
symmetric information. We adopt the standard alternating offers
bargaining procedure with an open time horizon analyzed in Rubinstein
(1982). While the bargaining procedureis open ended,bargaining frictions
ensure that an agreement is reached immediately. For the speciﬁc type of
bargaining friction employed here, we follow Binmore, Rubinstein, and
Wolinsky (1986) and assume that after each round, there is a probability
δ that the renegotiations break down, in which case the project is not
reﬁnanced. 15
Without loss of generality, we assume that the investor makes the
ﬁrst offer, which Ei can either accept or reject.16 The offer is to provide
reﬁnancing in return for a share of the project’s payoff. If Ei rejects the
investor’s offer, provided that negotiations have not yet broken down, he
can make a counteroffer, and so on. It is crucial that the entrepreneur can
make counteroffers. If all Ei could do is accept or reject the investor’s
offers, the investor could extract the entire surplus. Ei’s continuation
payoff at t = 1 would then always be siR0 regardless of his interim type,
whichinturnimpliesthattherewouldbenodifferencebetweenconstrained
and unconstrained ﬁnance in terms of providing incentives. However, a
bargaining procedure in which only the investor can make offers would
15 Modeling bargaining frictions by a risk of breakdown is standard. In contrast to the case in which
bargaining frictions take the form of delay, the risk of breakdown ensures that the two parties’ outside
options are always relevant. That bilateral bargaining with a risk of breakdown, but not bargaining with
delay, can support the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution with threat points, is shown in Binmore,
Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986).
16 As is standard in the literature, we consider the limit as bargaining frictions go to zero, that is, δ → 0.I n
the limit, it is irrelevant who makes the ﬁrst offer. See the proof of Lemma 1 for details.
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require that she can credibly commit to not listening to any offers the
entrepreneurmakes,whichseemstobedifﬁculttoimplementinpractice.17
The analysis of the bargaining game is straightforward. If a project with
interim type ψi ∈{ l,h} is not reﬁnanced, it generates an expected payoff
of R0. Hence, if ψi ∈{ l,h} the outside options in the renegotiations are
(1 − si)R0 and siR0, respectively, while the surplus to be bargained over
is rψi. Lemma 1 characterizes the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining
game as δ → 0. The proof follows Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky
(1986).
Lemma 1. Under unconstrained ﬁnance, the investor’s and entrepreneur Ei’s
continuation payoffs at t = 1 are as follows:
i) If Ei has interim type ψi = n, both continuation payoffs are zero.
ii) If Ei has interim type ψi ∈{ l,h},E i’s continuation payoff is siR0 + 1
2rψi
and the investor’s continuation payoff is (1 − si)R0 + 1
2rψi.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.2 Renegotiations under constrained ﬁnance
Under constrained ﬁnance, the investor cannot reﬁnance all projects that
are worth reﬁnancing, implying that she can credibly threaten to use her
scarce capital for the other portfolio project. The renegotiations with Ei
therefore depend on the interim type of the other entrepreneur, Ej,f o r
two reasons. First, who the investor picks to bargain with ﬁrst depends on
who has a higher interim type. Second, the investor’s outside option in the
renegotiations with Ei depends on Ej’s interim type, and vice versa.18
The extensive form of the bargaining game is as follows. The investor
picks one of the two entrepreneurs, say Ei, and makes him an offer. If Ei
accepts, the game ends. If Ei rejects, the negotiations with Ei break down
with probability δ. If there is no breakdown, Ei can make a counteroffer.
If the investor accepts Ei’s counteroffer, the game ends. If the investor
rejects, the negotiations with Ei break down with probability δ.I ft h e r e
is no breakdown, the investor again picks one of the two entrepreneurs,
and so on. In contrast, if the negotiations with Ei have broken down, the
investor must necessarily turn to Ej. Hence, the bargaining procedure is
the same alternating offer procedure, with the same open time horizon
and risk of breakdown as in the case of unconstrained ﬁnance, except that
after each round the investor can choose with whom to bargain next.
If at least one entrepreneur has interim type ψ = n, the outcome is
trivially the same as under unconstrained ﬁnance. The interesting case
17 Besides, the notion that the investor can extract the entire surplus at t = 1 does not square with our
assumption that the entrepreneur is essential to continue the project.
18 This is provided both entrepreneurs are still present, that is, there is no breakdown.
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is where neither entrepreneur has interim type ψ = n. As the following
lemma shows, the investor can then extract a higher continuation payoff
fromherﬁrstpick,sayEi,relativeto unconstrainedﬁnance.Thedownside
is that shecannot realizeany surpluswith hersecondpickEj, as herscarce
capital has already been used up.
Lemma 2. Under constrained ﬁnance, the investor’s and the two
entrepreneurs’ continuation payoffs at t = 1 are as follows:
i) If at least one entrepreneur has interim type ψ = n, all payoffs are as in
Lemma 1.
ii) If neither entrepreneur has interim type ψ = n, and if the investor picks
Ei to bargain with ﬁrst, then







b) Ej’s continuation payoff is sjR0, and









If both entrepreneurs have the same interim type ψ ∈{ l,h}, the investor
cannot extract the entire surplus from her ﬁrst pick Ei even though the
other entrepreneur is a perfect substitute. This may seem surprising. Why
does the investor not deviate and go to the other entrepreneur Ej,w h o
shouldbeeagertoobtainreﬁnancing,evenunderlessfavorableconditions,
given that he would otherwise only obtain sjR0? The reason is that Ej
would not accept an offer that leaves him just a little more than his outside
option payoff. Instead, he would reject the investor’s offer, and make a
counteroffer that makes the investor indifferent between accepting and
going back to her ﬁrst pick Ei.
Finally, we consider the issue of who the investor picks to bargain with
ﬁrst. Note that the initial sharing rule si does not affect the investor’s
choice; it depends exclusively on the entrepreneurs’ interim types. When
the two interim types are not identical, the investor bargains ﬁrst with the
higher interim type. When the two interim types are identical, the investor
is indifferent. In this case, we specify that she picks either of the two
entrepreneurs with equal probability (see proof of Lemma 2).
2.3 The responsiveness condition
Given Lemmas 1 and 2, we can compute the entrepreneur’s expected
payoff at t = 0. The derivation is in the Appendix. The entrepreneur’s
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Below, we consider the entrepreneur’s effort choice problem. The more
responsive the entrepreneur’s expected payoff is to his ex ante type,
the easier it is to motivate him to choose θ = g rather than θ = b.W e
obtain the responsiveness under unconstrained ﬁnance by subtracting the







(rh − rl). (2)
Importantly, the responsiveness does not correspond to the full difference
in expected project values as the investor can extract part of this value in
the renegotiations.

















3 − qθi + qθj
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Under constrained ﬁnance, the two entrepreneurs compete for scarce
informed capital. Consequently, if the other entrepreneur also has a
proﬁtable reﬁnancing opportunity, the investor can extract more from a
given entrepreneur than she can under unconstrained ﬁnance. Our key
insight, however, is that offering constrained ﬁnance may, nevertheless,
make an entrepreneur’s expected payoff more responsive to his ex ante
type: While the investor’s stronger ex post bargaining position reduces the
entrepreneur’s expected payoff for a given ex ante type, the difference in
expectedpayoffsacrossexantetypescanbeincreased.Aswillbecomeclear
shortly, we are interested in the case in which both entrepreneurs choose
θ = g. Consequently, we obtain the responsiveness under constrained
ﬁnance by setting θj = g and subtracting the entrepreneur’s expected












rl − 3qg (rh − rl)

. (4)
Comparing the responsiveness under unconstrained ﬁnance, (2), with
that under constrained ﬁnance, (4), establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The responsiveness of the entrepreneur’s expected payoff to
his ex ante type is higher under constrained ﬁnance than under unconstrained
ﬁnance if and only if




1300Financing a Portfolio of Projects
We will henceforth refer to Equation (5) as the ‘‘responsiveness
condition.’’ It captures the trade-off between two effects of competition
for scarce informed capital under constrained ﬁnance:
Competition Effect: Under constrained ﬁnance, not being picked ﬁrst
to be bargained with implies that the entrepreneur will not receive
reﬁnancing in equilibrium. Thus, competition for scarce informed capital
introduces an additional incremental return to being picked ﬁrst, making
the entrepreneur’s expected payoff more sensitive to his ex ante type.
Bargaining Power Effect: Under constrained ﬁnance, the investor can
threaten to reﬁnance the other entrepreneurwhen bargaining with her ﬁrst
pick. This provides the investor with additional bargaining power, which
reduces the entrepreneur’s expected return from being reﬁnanced, thereby
reducing the responsiveness.
If the responsiveness condition (5) holds, the entrepreneur’s expected
payoff under constrained ﬁnance is more sensitive to his ex ante type
than it is under unconstrained ﬁnance. Put simply, constrained ﬁnance
then provides stronger effort incentives than does unconstrained ﬁnance.
Intuitively, unconstrained ﬁnance provides effort incentives through the
difference in ﬁnal payoffs rh − rl = Rh − Rl (see Equation (2)). If this
difference is large, the incentives provided under unconstrained ﬁnance
are already quite substantial. Accordingly, the additional incentives under
constrained ﬁnance created through competition for scarce informed
capital have relatively little value, and the competition effect is dominated
by the bargaining power effect. Conversely, if rh − rl is small, the
incentives provided under unconstrained ﬁnance are relatively small, and
the additional incentives under constrained ﬁnance through competition
for scarce informed capital offset the negative bargaining power effect. As
we will show in the following section, (5) is a necessary but not sufﬁcient
condition for constrained ﬁnance to be chosen.
3. Constrained versus Unconstrained Finance
3.1 Analysis
We now analyze the investor’s choice between constrained and
unconstrained ﬁnance. There are exactly two cases in which the investor
will choose constrained ﬁnance: when constrained ﬁnance is the only
viable alternative, that is, the investor can break even only under
constrainedﬁnance,andwhenbothalternativesareviable,butconstrained
ﬁnance gives entrepreneurs a higher expected payoff. As there is ex ante
competitionfor entrepreneurs,investorschooseconstrainedﬁnancein this
case.
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It is easy to show that neither case is possible if constrained and
unconstrained ﬁnance both implement the same level of effort. Hence,
constrained ﬁnance is chosen only if it implements higher effort. That is,
constrained ﬁnance must implement θ = g, while unconstrained ﬁnance
must implement θ = b. By Equations (2) and (4), this in turn implies, ﬁrst,
that theresponsivenesscondition(5) musthold,andsecond,that theeffort


















rl − 3qg (rh − rl)

. (6)
The condition (6) has an intuitive interpretation.19 If effort is not
particularly costly so that even unconstrained ﬁnance can induce high
effort, constrained ﬁnance cannot play out its advantage of providing
relativelystrongereffortincentives.Conversely,ifeffortisextremelycostly
so that even constrained ﬁnance cannot induce high effort, then, again, it
does not matter that constrainedﬁnanceprovides relatively stronger effort
incentives.
If the necessary conditions hold, the choice between constrained
and unconstrained ﬁnance becomes straightforward. If only constrained
ﬁnance is viable—that is, the investor can break even only under
constrainedﬁnance—thenclearly,constrainedﬁnanceischosen.Likewise,
if only unconstrained ﬁnance is viable, then unconstrained ﬁnance is
chosen. Finally, if constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance are both viable,
competition for entrepreneurs implies that the investor chooses the
ﬁnancing mode that gives entrepreneurs a higher expected payoff.
To see whether a project is ﬁnancially viable, we must derive the
investor’s expected payoff at t = 0. The derivation is analogous to that of
Equations (1) and (3), with the addition that θi = b for unconstrained and
θi = θj = g for constrained ﬁnance (see proof of Proposition 2). As the
investor’s expectedpayoff decreasesin the entrepreneur’spayoff share, the
project is viable if and only if the investor’s expected payoff is nonnegative








[rl + qb (rh − rl)]

≥ I1, (7)
19 If entrepreneurs are indifferent between θ = b and θ = g, we assume without loss of generality that they
choose θ = b. Note that if the responsiveness condition (5) holds, there exists always a nonempty set of B
values that satisfy condition (6).
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≥ I1. (8)
If constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance are both viable, ex ante
competition among investors implies that they will choose the ﬁnancing
mode that is better for entrepreneurs. The entrepreneur’s expected payoff
in this case can be easily derived from Equations (1) and (3), and
the investors’ zero-proﬁt condition (see proof of Proposition 2). The
following proposition summarizes the investors’ optimal choice between
unconstrained and constrained ﬁnance:
Proposition 2. Suppose that the responsiveness condition (5) holds and
B satisﬁes (6). For any given investment cost I1, projects whose success
probability τ is sufﬁciently low are not ﬁnancially viable. For projects that
are ﬁnancially viable, the following holds:
i) For projects with a sufﬁciently high investment cost—provided the project
is ﬁnanced at all—only unconstrained ﬁnance is chosen.
ii) For projects with low investment costs, other things equal, constrained
ﬁnance is chosen if the project’s success probability is low, and unconstrained
ﬁnance is chosen if the project’s success probability is high.
Proof. See Appendix.
By Proposition 2, if (i) the responsiveness condition (5) is violated,
implying that unconstrained ﬁnance provides relatively stronger effort
incentives than does constrained ﬁnance, or (ii) the effort cost B is either
too low or too high, so that condition (6) is violated, implying that
constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance both implement the same effort,
or (iii) the investment cost is too high, then constrained ﬁnance will not
be chosen.20 Conversely, if (i)–(iii) hold, then constrained ﬁnance will be
chosen for relatively low success probabilities, and unconstrained ﬁnance
will be chosen for relatively high success probabilities.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 2. The success probability τ is
depicted on the x-axis, and the investment cost I1 is depicted on the y-axis.
Theverticallyandhorizontallyshadedareasdepictall(τ,I1)combinations
for which constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance are chosen, respectively.
The unshaded area depicts all (τ,I1) combinations for which the project
is not ﬁnancially viable.
20 To be precise, Proposition 2 does not require that conditions (5) and (6) hold for all τ>0.T h et w o
conditions only need to hold for sufﬁciently large success probabilities for which constrained ﬁnance is
viable.








Illustration of Proposition 2. In the ﬁgure, πI
U represents the investor’s expected gross payoff under
unconstrained ﬁnanced as deﬁned in Equation (7), πI
C represents the investor’s expected gross payoff
under constrained ﬁnanced as deﬁned in Equation (8), I1 represents the project’s ex ante investment
cost, and τ represents the project’s probability of success. The entrepreneur’s expected payoff is larger
(smaller) under constrained ﬁnance if τ< 
 τ (if τ> 
 τ). The vertically (horizontally) shaded area depicts
all combinations of I1 and τ for which constrained (unconstrained) ﬁnance is chosen. The nonshaded area
depicts all combinations of I1 and τ for which the project is not ﬁnancially viable.
Perhaps the simplest way to illustrate Proposition 2 is by ﬁxing I1 and
drawing an imaginary horizontal line originating at I1 that runs parallel to
the x-axis. In Proposition 2, ‘‘ﬁxing I1 ’’ is implied by ‘‘otherthings equal,’’
which implies that projects are compared only with respect to their success
probabilities. Holding I1 ﬁxed, the intersection of the horizontal line with
the unshaded area shows all the success probabilities for which the project
is not ﬁnancially viable, the intersection with the vertically shaded area
shows all success probabilities for which constrained ﬁnance is chosen,
and the intersection with the horizontally shaded area shows all success
probabilities for which unconstrained ﬁnance is chosen.21
Part (i) of Proposition 2 refers to values of I1 that lie above the point
where πI
U and πI
C intersect. For such high investment costs, the project is
viableonlyiftheprobabilityofsuccessishigh,inwhichcaseunconstrained
ﬁnanceischosen.Intuitively,forhighsuccessprobabilities,theallocational
inefﬁciency induced by constrained ﬁnance—namely, that if both projects
are successful, one of them will not be reﬁnanced—weighs heavily in
expected terms.
21 It is easy to construct a numerical example. If qb = 1/4, qg = 1/2, rl = 7, rh = 11, R0 = 8,a n dB = 1/2,
then (5) and (6) hold for all τ>0. Given the expressions for the investor’s and entrepreneur’s expected
payoffs derived in the Appendix, it can be easily veriﬁed that 
 τ = 1/8, while πI
U and πI
C intersect at
τ = 1/2, implying that case (i) of Proposition 2 holds if I1 ≥ 6, and case (ii) holds if I1 < 6. For example,
when I1 = 1, the project is not viable if τ<0.0805, constrained ﬁnance is chosen if 0.0805 ≤ τ ≤ 1/8,a n d
unconstrained ﬁnance is chosen if τ>1/8.
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at I1 intersects ﬁrst with the unshaded area, then with the vertically
shaded area, and ﬁnally with the horizontally shaded area. Projects
with relatively low success probabilities are therefore ﬁnanced under
constrained ﬁnance, while projects with high success probabilities are
ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance.
In Figure 2, τ =
 τ marks the critical success probability at which the
entrepreneur’s expected payoffs under constrained and unconstrained
ﬁnance intersect.22 If both ﬁnancing modes are ﬁnancially viable,
constrained ﬁnance is chosen for success probabilities τ ≤
 τ, and
unconstrained ﬁnance is chosen for success probabilities τ> 
 τ.I nt h e
(vertically shaded) ‘‘lens-shaped’’ area, unconstrained ﬁnance is not
ﬁnancially viable, implying that constrained ﬁnance is chosen also for
success probabilities τ> 
 τ.
Proposition 2 lends itself to two intuitive empirical implications. The
ﬁrst is that projects with very high investment costs should not be ﬁnanced
under constrained ﬁnance. This statement is independent of whether the
twonecessaryconditions(5)and(6)hold.Unfortunately,asimilarlystrong
statement cannot be made about when projects should be ﬁnanced under
constrained ﬁnance, for two reasons: The necessary conditions (5) and
(6) may not hold, and the investment cost may be too high, so that part
(i) of Proposition 2 applies. However, one can argue the converse and in
somesenseweakerstatementthatifprojectsareﬁnancedunderconstrained
ﬁnance,then,otherthingsequal,theymusthavelowersuccessprobabilities
than comparable projects ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance.
We conclude with a comparative statics exercise. The beneﬁt of
constrained ﬁnance in our model is that it may induce high effort when
unconstrained ﬁnance can induce only low effort. But if the efﬁciency
loss from exerting low effort is relatively small, the beneﬁt is also small.
Intuitively, we might therefore expect that constrained ﬁnance is more
likely if the efﬁciency loss from exerting low effort is large, which is the
case when qb—the likelihood that exerting low effort generates a high
interim type ψ = h —is small. The following corollary formalizes this
intuition.
Corollary 1. Other things equal, an increase in the efﬁciencyloss from having
low entrepreneurial effort makes it more likely that constrained ﬁnance is
chosen.
22 The derivation of
 τ and the entrepreneur’s payoffs under constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance are found
in the proof of Proposition 2, which also shows that ˆ τ lies to the left of the intersection of πI
U and πI
C as
depicted in Figure 2.
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Given the analysis in the proof of Proposition 2, the proof of Corollary
1 is immediate. In Figure 2, a decrease in qb shifts both 
 τ and πI
U to
the right, thereby strictly expanding the range of success probabilities for
which constrained ﬁnance is chosen.23
3.2 Empirical implications
The ﬁrst implication summarizes a key insight of our model:
Implication1.Otherthingsequal,projectsﬁnancedunderconstrainedﬁnance
should have lower success probabilities than comparable projects ﬁnanced
under unconstrained ﬁnance.
The intuition, which is at the heart of our model, is that for high
success probabilities the allocational inefﬁciency induced by constrained
ﬁnance—namely, that successful projects may not be reﬁnanced—weighs
heavily in expected terms, implying that such projects are optimally
ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance.
Like Implication 1, the following implication has been discussed in the
previous section:
Implication 2. Other things equal, projects with very high investment costs
should not be ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance.
The intuition is closely related to that of Implication 1. Projects with very
high investment costs require a high success probability to break even.
But for high success probabilities, the beneﬁts of constrained ﬁnance are
outweighed by the costs.
The next empirical implication is a restatement of Corollary 1.
Implication3.Otherthingsequal,projectsaremorelikelytobeﬁnancedunder
constrained ﬁnance if the efﬁciency loss from having low entrepreneurial
effort is large.
There are two aspects to the entrepreneurs’ effort problem in our
model. The ﬁrst, addressed in Implication 3, regards the importance
of entrepreneurial effort—that is, what is the efﬁciency loss from having
low (instead of high) entrepreneurial effort? Intuitively, if the efﬁciency
loss from having low effort is small, the beneﬁts of constrained ﬁnance,
namely, that it provides relatively stronger effort incentives, are also small
and likely to be outweighed by the allocational inefﬁciency associated with
constrained ﬁnance.
23 Moreover, a decrease in qb makes it more likely that case (ii) in Proposition 2 applies, for two reasons:
The set of admissible B values satisfying (6) becomes larger, and the fact that πI
U shifts to the right implies
that the critical investment cost above which case (i) applies is shifted upwards.
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The second aspect concerns the severity of the effort problem: How
costly is entrepreneurial effort? In this regard, a necessary condition for
constrained ﬁnance to be chosen is that the effort is sufﬁciently costly.
If effort is not particularly costly, so that even unconstrained ﬁnance
can induce high effort, constrained ﬁnance cannot play out its advantage
of providing relatively stronger effort incentives. By the same token,
entrepreneurial effort must not be too costly. If effort is extremely costly,
so that even constrained ﬁnance cannot induce high effort, constrained
ﬁnance again loses its advantage. We thus have:
Implication 4. Projects for which inducing entrepreneurial effort is either not
particularlycostlyorextremelycostlyshouldbeﬁnancedunderunconstrained
ﬁnance.
An immediate corollary to Implication 4 is that, other things equal,
we should see that projects ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance exhibit
higher entrepreneurial effort. Importantly, our model does not predict
that projects ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance should have a higher ex
postlikelihoodofsuccess.Whileinourmodelconstrainedﬁnanceischosen
only if it induces higher effort, Implication 1 states that projects ﬁnanced
under constrained ﬁnance should have a lower ex ante success probability.
As the two effects move in opposite directions, the overall effect on the
project’s ex post success likelihood remains ambiguous.
Under unconstrained ﬁnance, there is no allocational inefﬁciency:
ProjectsrejectedatthereﬁnancingstagearealwaysnegativeNPVprojects.
By contrast, under constrained ﬁnance, rejected projects may have either
a negative or positive NPV.
Implication 5. Projects rejected under constrained ﬁnance should on average
have a higher NPV than projects rejected under unconstrained ﬁnance.
It would seem that a natural corollary to Implication 5 is that projects
rejected under constrained ﬁnance should ﬁnd it easier to obtain outside
ﬁnance. As Section 4.2 shows, however, this may or may not be true. In
particular, if the lemons problem that outside investors face is sufﬁciently
strong,thenprojectsrejectedunderconstrainedandunconstrainedﬁnance
may both ﬁnd it impossible to attract outside ﬁnance.
A related empirical implication concerns the likelihood that projects
are rejected at the reﬁnancing stage. Under unconstrained ﬁnance, this
likelihood is simply 1 − τ. By contrast, under constrained ﬁnance, the
likelihood of rejection is strictly higher.24 Moreover, we know from
24 Straightforward calculations show that the likelihood that a project is rejected at the reﬁnancing stage
under constrained ﬁnance is 1 − τ + 1
2τ2.
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Implication 1 that projects for which constrained ﬁnance is chosen should
have lower ex ante success probabilities to begin with. As both effects
move in the same direction, we have:
Implication 6. Projects ﬁnanced under constrained ﬁnance should have a
higher likelihood of being rejected at the reﬁnancing stage than projects
ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance.
4. Adverse Selection
This section considers the role of asymmetric information both at the ex
anteandthereﬁnancingstages.Ourbasemodelassumedthatentrepreneurs
can choose their ex ante type. In Section 4.1, we assume instead that ex
ante types are chosen by nature, and that only the respective entrepreneur
can observe his ex ante type. Hence, we consider an adverse selection
problem instead of a moral hazard problem.
In Section 4.2, we consider the role of asymmetric information at the
reﬁnancingstage.The(inside)investorandentrepreneurknowtheproject’s
interimtype,butoutsideinvestorsdonot.Ourbasemodelassumesthatthe
resulting lemons problem is sufﬁciently strong to render outside ﬁnancing
at the reﬁnancing stage infeasible. We now formally show under what
conditions this is the case. Moreover, we show that our results hold
qualitatively even in cases in which outside ﬁnancing at the reﬁnancing
stage is feasible.
4.1 Ex ante asymmetric information
Contrarytoourbasemodel,wenowassumethattheentrepreneur’sexante
type is chosen by nature prior to t = 0. With probability α, nature chooses
θ = g, and with probability 1 − α, nature chooses θ = b. Entrepreneurs
know their ex ante types, but investors do not. Hence, at t = 0, when
investors compete for entrepreneurs, the former face an adverse selection
problem.Tosimplifytheexposition,weassumethatprojectsareﬁnancially
viable. From our previous analysis, we know that this is the case if the
initial investment I1 is not too large.
Supposeforthemomentthatunconstrainedﬁnanceistheonlyﬁnancing
mode available to investors. We consider competitive equilibria ` al a
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). As explained previously, the initial sharing
rule si does not affect the investor’s choice as to which project she
reﬁnances. Consequently, separation between ex ante types θ = g and
θ = b cannot be achieved by offering a menu of initial sharing rules, as
both types of entrepreneurs would strictly prefer the highest sharing rule
offered. The following result is then immediate.
Lemma3.Supposeunconstrainedﬁnanceistheonlyﬁnancingmodeavailable
to investors. Then the unique competitive equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium
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in which all entrepreneurs receive the same sharing rule regardless of their
ex ante type.
Wenowarguethatallowinginvestorstochoosebetweenconstrainedand
unconstrained ﬁnance may enable them to separate type θ = g from type
θ = b entrepreneurs. Recall from Proposition 1 that if the responsiveness
condition (5) holds, the payoff differential across ex ante types is larger
under constrained ﬁnance. This implies that condition (5) is necessary but
notsufﬁcienttoachieveseparationacrosstypes.Toachieveseparation,the
difference in the responsiveness between constrained and unconstrained
ﬁnance must additionally be sufﬁciently large so that separation can be
achieved at sufﬁciently favorable terms for type θ = g entrepreneurs.
Moreover, the allocational inefﬁciency induced by constrained ﬁnance
must not be too large. Otherwise, investors offering constrained ﬁnance
will be unable to offer mutually proﬁtable contracts that can achieve
separation.
In addition to these conditions, we obtain the usual condition arising
in competitive screening models that the probability α of type θ = g
entrepreneursmust not be too large. The following proposition establishes
conditions under which all of the above requirements are met. As in
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we restrict consideration to pure-strategy
equilibria.
Proposition 3. Consider the following separating equilibrium: Entrepreneurs
withexantetypeθ = b receiveunconstrainedﬁnance,andentrepreneurswith
ex ante type θ = g receive constrained ﬁnance. Suppose the responsiveness
condition (5) holds. Then this separating equilibrium exists and is the unique
competitive equilibrium if
τ ≤
(qg − qb)(rh − rl)
rl + q2






















4.2 Interim asymmetric information and outside ﬁnance
While there is perfect competition for entrepreneurs at t = 0, we have
assumed that the (inside) investor is the only source of funding at the
reﬁnancing stage—that is, projects that are not reﬁnanced by the inside
investor cannot obtain reﬁnancing from outside investors. Intuitively, the
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market for outside ﬁnance may shut down at the reﬁnancing stage owing
to a ‘‘lemons problem.’’ The insiders, namely, the entrepreneur and inside
investor, know the project’s interim type, but outside investors do not.
If successful projects are pooled with ‘‘lemons’’—that is, projects with
interim type ψ = n—then outside investors may be unable to make an




validating the assumption in our base model. Second, to the extent that
there is also an equilibrium in which outside ﬁnance is feasible, we show
that our results hold qualitatively. The inside investor is then no longer the
only potential provider of capital at the reﬁnancing stage, but she is still
the only provider of informed capital, as only she, but no outside investor,
knows the project’s interim type. Accordingly, outside ﬁnance commands
a lemons premium, providing the inside investor (again) with a strong
bargaining position: While projects do not compete for scarce capital at
the reﬁnancing stage, they now compete for cheaper (informed) capital.
For a lemons problem to exist at the reﬁnancing stage, type ψ = n
projects must have an incentive to seek outside ﬁnance. Otherwise, the
pool of projects seeking outside ﬁnance would consist only of positive
NPV projects. In our model thus far, insiders do not strictly beneﬁt from
luring outside investors into reﬁnancing a type ψ = n project. But they do
if we changeourmodelas follows: Supposetype ψ = n projects,instead of
having a zero success probability, have a small but positive probability pn
ofgeneratingR>0.Ifpn issmall,reﬁnancingatypeψ = nprojectremains
a negative NPV investment.25 Most importantly, this modiﬁcation has no
effect on our previous results. In particular, the renegotiatons between
the entrepreneur and the inside investor remain exactly the same: There
is still no reﬁnancing of type ψ = n projects by the inside investor, and
type ψ = n projects still generate a zero payoff if they are not reﬁnanced.
However, the insiders now strictly beneﬁt from luring outside investors
into reﬁnancing a type ψ = n project: They have nothing to lose, but they
may gain R − D with probability pn.
The market for outside ﬁnance at t = 1 operates as follows. Projects,
representedbytheinsiders,expresstheirwillingnesstoseekoutsideﬁnance.
Outside investors then compete to provide funds I2 in return for a share
D ≤ R of the project’s payoff.26 Given the modiﬁcation introduced above,
the insiders now strictly prefer to seek outside ﬁnance for unsuccessful
projects. In contrast, the insiders may have something to lose from seeking
25 Precisely, it must hold that pn <I 2/R.
26 In a two-payoff model, with one payoff being R>0 and the other payoff being zero, any feasible ﬁnancial
contract must necessarily involve a positive repayment if the payoff is R.
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costly outside ﬁnance for successful projects. As successful projects are
pooled with lemons, outside ﬁnance may be available only at unfavorable
terms. If these terms are sufﬁciently unfavorable, the insiders may prefer
nottoreﬁnanceasuccessfulproject—thusrealizingR0—insteadofseeking
costly outside ﬁnance. Formally, the insiders will seek outside ﬁnance for
at y p eψ ∈{ l,h} project if and only if
λψ := pψ(R − D)− R0 ≥ 0. (9)
The difference
rψ − λψ = pψR − I2 − pψ(R − D) = pψD − I2
represents the lemons premium associated with costly outside ﬁnance. If
therewas noasymmetricinformationvis-` a-vis outsiders,theinsiderscould
always obtain funds I2 in return for a repayment F = I2/pψ, realizing
an expected payoff of pψ(R − F)= pψR − I2. If there is asymmetric
information, however, outside investors will demand a higher repayment
D>Fowing to the possibility of ﬁnancing a lemon.
Our equilibrium concept is that of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
which outside investors rationally anticipate which projects seek outside
ﬁnance. Given these rational beliefs, outside investors compete themselves
down to zero proﬁts. The following result characterizes all (pure-strategy)
equilibria under constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance.
Proposition 4. Under unconstrained ﬁnance, the market for outside ﬁnance
at the reﬁnancing stage shuts down completely. Likewise, under constrained
ﬁnance,thereisalwaysanequilibriuminwhichthemarketforoutsideﬁnance
shuts down. Depending on τ, there may exist two additional equilibria under
constrained ﬁnance: If τ is sufﬁciently large, there exists an equilibrium in
which all three interim types have access to costly outside ﬁnance at the
reﬁnancing stage, while if τ lies in some intermediate range, there exists
an equilibrium in which only interim types ψ ∈{ n,h} have access to costly
outside ﬁnance.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is straightforward. Given that
any offer that outside investors make also attracts all lemons, outside
investors must set D relatively high to break even. Outside ﬁnance thus
involves a lemons premium, which makes it costly. Under unconstrained
ﬁnance, the inside investor has sufﬁcient funds to reﬁnance all successful
projects. There is thus no need to draw on costly outside ﬁnance. This
implies that the only projects seeking outside ﬁnance are lemons, which
in turn implies that the market for outside ﬁnance shuts down. Likewise,
under constrained ﬁnance, there is always an equilibrium in which the
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marketforoutsideﬁnanceshutsdown.Irrespectiveofτ orotherparameter
values, if outside investors believe that only lemons seek outside ﬁnance,
then outside ﬁnance becomes infeasible. This validates the assumption in
our base model that the only source of funding at the interim stage is the
inside investor.
But Proposition 4 also shows that, at least for certain parameter values,
there may be additional equilibria under constrained ﬁnance in which
outside ﬁnance is feasible at the reﬁnancing stage.27 Arguably, since
outside ﬁnance commands a lemons premium, the inside investor will
always ﬁnd it optimal to use up her capital of I2 to reﬁnance one of the
two projects (unless both are failures, of course). But if outside ﬁnance is
feasible, then the other project may also be reﬁnanced—depending on the
project’s interim type, of course—implyingthat inside and outside ﬁnance
may coexist at the reﬁnancing stage.
Given that there may be an equilibrium in which projects that are
not reﬁnanced by the inside investor have access to outside ﬁnance, it
is important to check whether our previous results hold qualitatively if
outside ﬁnance is costly but feasible. For the sake of brevity, we only
consider the equilibrium in Proposition 4 in which all three interim types
have access to costly outside ﬁnance. It is easy to verify that qualitatively
similar results are obtained regarding the other equilibrium in which only
type ψ = n and type ψ = h projects have access to costly outside ﬁnance.
The following proposition establishes the analogue of the responsiveness
condition (5) for the case in which outside ﬁnance is costly but feasible.
Proposition 5. Consider the equilibrium in Proposition 4 in which all three
interim types have access to costly outside ﬁnance at the reﬁnancing stage.
Given this equilibrium, the responsiveness of the entrepreneur’s expected
payoff to his ex ante type is higher under constrained ﬁnance than under
unconstrained ﬁnance if and only if





The responsiveness condition is now expressed in terms of the lemon
premium rψ − λψ, as the insiders now bargain over the cost savings from
using cheaper informed capital at the reﬁnancing stage. Most importantly,
the responsiveness condition retains its basic qualitative structure from
Proposition 1. This points to the crucial driver behind the responsiveness
27 The conditions for an equilibrium in which all three interim types have access to costly outside ﬁnance,
and the one in which only interim types ψ ∈{ n,h} have access to costly outside ﬁnance, are not mutually
exclusive. It is easy to ﬁnd values of τ for which both equilibria exist (in addition to the equilibrium in
which the market for outside ﬁnance shuts down, which always exists).
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condition: There must be a beneﬁt to being reﬁnanced by the inside
investor. This implies that there will be a beneﬁt to being a high interim
type, which in turn implies a beneﬁt to exerting high effort. Whether this
beneﬁtarisesbecausenotbeingreﬁnancedbytheinsideinvestormeansnot
being reﬁnanced at all, as in our base model, or whether it arises because
not being reﬁnanced by the inside investor means a lower surplus due to
the use of costly outside ﬁnance, as above, is irrelevant for our model’s
central argument.
5. Conclusions
This article shows that investors ﬁnancing a portfolio of investment
projects may use the depth of their ﬁnancial pockets to overcome
entrepreneurial agency problems. Limiting the amount of capital allows
investors to credibly commit to a tournamentamong portfolio projects for
(cheaper)informedcapitalatthereﬁnancingstage.Whilethisimprovesthe
investor’s ex post bargaining position, thereby reducing the entrepreneur’s
expected payoff, it may, nevertheless, also improve the entrepreneur’s
incentives. This is because projects funded by investors with scarce capital
must have not only a positive NPV at the reﬁnancing stage, but one that
is higher than that of competing portfolio projects. As a consequence,
committing to ‘‘shallow’’ pockets may be optimal despite the allocational
inefﬁciency when positive NPV projects are not reﬁnanced.
Committing to shallow pockets (or ‘‘constrained ﬁnance’’) may have
also beneﬁts in dealing with adverse selection problems. If all investors
have deep pockets (‘‘unconstrained ﬁnance’’), it may be impossible to
separate good from bad entrepreneurs. If investors can choose between
constrained and unconstrained ﬁnance, however, such separation may be
possible. In the separating equilibrium in question, bad entrepreneurs are




ﬁnance should have lower ex ante success probabilities than comparable
projects ﬁnanced under unconstrained ﬁnance. The intuition, which lies
at the heart of our model, is that for high success probabilities, the
allocational inefﬁciency induced by constrained ﬁnance weighs heavily
in expected terms, implying that such projects are better ﬁnanced under
unconstrained ﬁnance. The same intuition holds for projects with high
investment costs, as such projects require a high probability of success to
be ﬁnancially viable. On the other hand, the main beneﬁt of constrained
ﬁnance in our model is that it may provide stronger effort incentives to
entrepreneurs. Hence, another empirical implication is that constrained
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ﬁnance should be more likely if the efﬁciency loss from having low
entrepreneurial effort is large.
Appendix A:
Proof of Lemma 1. Claim (i) is obvious. As for claim (ii), denote by yi := (1 − si)R0
and zi := siR0 the investor’s and Ei’s continuation payoffs, respectively, if the project
is not reﬁnanced, and by vi := Rψi − I2 and wi := vi − (yi + zi) = rψi their combined
continuation payoffs and the net surplus, respectively, from reﬁnancing a project with
interim type ψi ∈{ l,h}.
Given that the proof is standard, we shall be brief. We characterize offers by the
continuation payoff X which the offer leaves to Ei. The investor always offers XI, while Ei
always offers XE. If the investor must respond to Ei’s offer, she accepts any XE satisfying
vi − XE ≥ δyi + (1 − δ)(vi − XI). (A1)
The right-hand side in Equation (A1) represents the investor’s payoff from rejecting Ei’s
offer: With probability δ, the negotiations with Ei break down, and the investor receives yi.
If negotiations do not break down, the investor makes her counteroffer XI. Similarly, if Ei
must respond to the investor’s offer, he accepts any XI satisfying
XI ≥ δzi + (1 − δ)XE. (A2)
As usual, offers along the equilibrium path must make the counterparty indifferent to
accepting and rejecting, implying that Equations (A1)–(A2) must hold with equality. Solving
Equation (A1) for XE and inserting the result in Equation (A2), we have
XI =
δzi + (1 − δ)δ(vi − yi)
δ(2 − δ)
, (A3)
which Ei accepts immediately.













implying that the investor’s equilibrium continuation payoff as δ → 0i s
lim
δ→0











XI,wesolvedforXE andtookthelimitasδ → 0,i.e.,limδ→0 XI = limδ→0 XE.Consequently,
instead of letting the investor make the ﬁrst offer, we could have assumed that Ei makes the
ﬁrst offer; the equilibrium continuation payoffs are identical.
Proof of Lemma 2. Claim (i) is obvious. As for claim (ii), we use the same notation as in the
proof of Lemma 1, except that we use subscripts i and j to distinguish between Ei and Ej.I f
ψi ∈{ l,h}, ψj ∈{ l,h},a n dψi  = ψj, we specify that the investor picks the entrepreneur with
the higher interim type. Without loss of generality, we assume that this is Ei. We conﬁrm
below that this strategy on the part of the investor is optimal. If ψi = ψj, the investor is
indifferent. In this case, we specify that the investor randomly picks an entrepreneur (with
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equal probability), with whom she then bargains until there is either a breakdown or an
agreement.28 Again without loss of generality, we assume that this is Ei.
Analogous to the proof of Lemma 1, the investor always offers xI




i + yj ≥ δ(yi + vj − XI
j) + (1 − δ)(yj + vi − xI
i ). (A5)
In Equation (A5), XI
j denotes the investor’s offer to Ej if he is the only entrepreneur present,
i.e., if the negotiations with Ei have broken down. We already know from Lemma 1 what this
offer is going to be. In contrast, xE
i and xI
i denote Ei’s and the investor’s offers, respectively,
if both entrepreneurs are still present. Note the difference to Equation (A1): If the investor





, also her outside option payoff yj
with Ej, whose project is not reﬁnanced. By contrast, if the investor rejects Ei’s offer, the
negotiations with Ei break down with probability δ, in which case she continues with Ej.
Finally, if the negotiations with Ei do not break down, the investor makes her counteroffer
xI
i .A sf o rEi, he always offers xE
i and accepts any counteroffer xI
i satisfying
xI
i ≥ δzi + (1 − δ)xE
i . (A6)
Analogous to the proof of Lemma 1, Equations (A5)–(A6) must hold with equality.
Solving Equations (A5) for xE
i and inserting the result in Equation (A6), we obtain
xI
i =




which Ei accepts immediately.
Analogous to Equation (A4), we obtain limδ→0 XI
j = zj + wj/2. Using L’Hˆ opital’s rule,
























which implies that the investor’s total equilibrium continuation payoff (i.e., including her
outside option payoff yj realized with Ej)a sδ → 0i s


























As in the proof of Lemma 1, we could have equally solved for xE
i and taken the limit as
δ → 0; the equilibrium continuation payoffs are identical.
Itremainstoshowthatifbothentrepreneursarestillpresentandψ i  = ψj,theinvestordoes





j + yi ≥ δ(yj + vi − XI
i ) + (1 − δ)(yj + vi − xI
i ). (A8)
28 One can show that in the limit as δ → 0, the same outcome would be obtained if the investor randomizes
in every round rather than staying with her ﬁrst pick. The analysis involves somewhat longer equations,
though.
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In Equation (A8), if the investor rejects Ej’s offer and the negotiations with Ej break down,
the investor must necessarily switch back to Ei. However, the investor also switches back to
Ei if the negotiations with Ej did not break down.29 As for Ej,h eo f f e r sxE




j ≥ δzj + (1 − δ)xE
j . (A9)
As previously, Equations (A8)–(A9) must hold with equality. Solving (A8) for xE
j and
inserting the result in Equations (A9) yields
xI
j = δzj + (1 − δ)(vj + yi − yj − vi + δXI
i + (1 − δ)xI
i ). (A10)
To conﬁrm that the investor does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate, we must show that
vi − xI
i + yj ≥ vj − xI
j + yi. (A11)
Inserting xI
j from Equations (A10) into (A11) and rearranging, (A11) becomes
δzj − δ(vj + yi − yj − vi) + (1 − δ)δXI
i ≥ xI
i δ(2 − δ). (A12)
Next, inserting (A7) into (A12), dividing through by δ, and rearranging, (A12) becomes
(1 − δ)(XI
i − XI
j) ≥ (zi − zj) − δ(vi − yi + yj − vj). (A13)
Note that from Equation (A3) we have that
XI
i =










j into Equation (A13), multiplying through by δ(2 − δ),a n d
rearranging, Equation (A13) becomes
δ[(vi − yi − zi) − (vj − yj − zj)] = δ(wi − wj) = δ(rψi − rψj ) ≥ 0,
which holds by assumption.
ProofofProposition1.ItremainstoderiveEquations(1)and(3).Considerﬁrstthederivation
of (1). Under unconstrained ﬁnance, the probabilities of having interim type ψ = n, ψ = l,
and ψ = h are 1 − τ, τ(1 − qθi),a n dτqθi, respectively. Multiplying these probabilities with
the respective continuation payoffs from Lemma 1 and rearranging yields Equation (1).
Consider next the derivation of (3). Given that the investor picks the entrepreneur
with the higher interim type ﬁrst, and if she is indifferent, she picks each of the two
entrepreneurs with equal probability (see proof of Lemma 2), Lemma 2 implies the following
expected continuation payoffs at t = 1f o rEk, an arbitrary entrepreneur: zero if ψk = n,






if ψk = h and ψ
j =k = l, skR0 + 1
2rψk
if ψk ∈{ l,h} and ψ
j =k = n,a n dskR0 + 1
8rψ if ψk = ψ
j =k = ψ ∈{ l,h}. Multiplying these
29 To prove that the investor’s strategy is optimal, it sufﬁces to consider one-stage deviations. See Fudenberg
and Tirole (1992), Theorem 4.2.
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expected continuation payoffs with the respective joint probabilities for interim types
(ψi,ψj) and rearranging yields Equation (3). The respective joint probabilities are τ2qθiqθj
for (h,h); τ2(1 − qθi)(1 − qθj ) for (l,l); (1 − τ)2 for (n,n); τ(1 − qθi)(1 − τ) for (l,n);
τ(1 − qθj )(1 − τ)for (n,l); τqθi(1 − τ)for (h,n); τqθj(1 − τ)for (n,h); τ2qθi(1 − qθj ) for
(h,l);a n dτ2qθj(1 − qθi) for (l,h).
Proof of Proposition 2. Analogous to the derivation of Equations (1) and (3) in the proof of
Proposition 1, we can derive the investor’s expected payoff at t = 0. Under unconstrained
ﬁnance, the investor’s expected payoff at t = 0i s
τ









and under constrained ﬁnance, it is
τ












1 + 3qθj − 3qθi





If Equations (5) and (6) hold, we have θi = b in the case of unconstrained ﬁnance and




(1 − si)R0 +
1
2

















g (rh − rl)

− I1, (A17)
respectively. Setting si = 0 in (A16) and (A17), respectively, we obtain πI
U − I1 and πI
C − I1
as deﬁned in Equations (7) and (8) in the main text.
We next derive the entrepreneur’s expected payoff at t = 0 if the project is ﬁnancially
viable and investors compete themselves down to zero proﬁts. Setting (A16) and (A17)
equal to zero, solving for si, and inserting the result in Equation (1) (with θi = b) and
(3) (with θi = θj = g), respectively, we have that Ei’s equilibrium expected payoff under
unconstrained ﬁnance is
πE
U − I1 := τ

R0 + rl + qb (rh − rl) + B

− I1, (A18)
and his equilibrium expected payoff under constrained ﬁnance is
πE
C − I1 := τ
















have been established, the rest of the proof is trivial. By inspection, πI
U and πE
U are both
linear and strictly increasing in τ.Moreover, both are zero at τ = 0, and πE
U lies strictly above
πI
U for all τ>0.30 Likewise, it is easily shown that πI
C and πE
C are both strictly concave,
30 Strictly speaking, (A18) and (A19) are meaningful only for values of τ for which the project is viable, i.e.,
values for which (A16) and (A17) are non-negative. This rules out τ = 0. However, given that all functions
in question are strictly increasing and either linear or strictly concave, considering the functions’ behavior
at τ = 0 tells us their behavior relative to each other for larger, admissible values of τ.
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= (qg − qb)(rh − rl) − B>0,
where the inequality follows from our assumption that θ = g is socially optimal. Hence, πE
C
lies strictly above πE
U for small τ, implying that it crosses πE
U exactly once from the left. In
Figure 2, this intersection point is denoted by
 τ. Straightforward calculations show that

 τ := 2
(qg − qb)(rh − rl) − B
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
< 1,
where the inequality follows from 2(qg − qb)(rh − rl) <r l + q2















(qg − qb)(rh − rl) > 0,
which establishes that πI
C lies strictly above πI
U for small τ, implying that it crosses πI
U
exactly once from the left as depicted in Figure 2. Denote the intersection of πI
C and πI
U by
 τ. Straightforward calculations show that
 τ := 4
(rh − rl)(qg − qb)
rl + q2
g (rh − rl)
>
 τ.
Associated with τ is a critical value of I1, which is equal to the value of πI
U (or, equivalently,
the value of πI
C)a tτ = τ.Denote this critical value by  I1. From Equation (7), we have that





[rl + qb (rh − rl)]

. (A20)
Case (i) of Proposition 2 then holds for I1 >  I1 while case (ii) holds for I1 ≤  I1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Denote by sC and sU the equilibrium sharing rules offered by
constrained and unconstrained investors, respectively. A separating equilibrium in which
type θ = g entrepreneurs prefer constrained ﬁnance and type θ = b entrepreneurs prefer
unconstrained ﬁnance exists if (i) sC and sU are incentive compatible, (ii) the investors’ and
entrepreneurs’ participation constraints hold, and (iii) there exists no other offer that can
break the proposed separating equilibrium. We now address each of these three conditions
in turn.
Consider incentive compatibility ﬁrst. In the proposed equilibrium, unconstrained
investors attract only type θ = b entrepreneurs and make zero proﬁts. Setting (A14) with
θi = b and si = sU equal to zero and solving for sU, we obtain
sU = 1 +
1
2




Consider next sC. Incentive compatibility for type θ = b entrepreneurs requires that
constrainedinvestorsoffersC suchthattypeθ = b entrepreneursweaklypreferunconstrained








, which holds by (5).
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3 − qb + qg











3 − qb + qg

+ 3qbqg (rh − rl)
R0 , (A22)
where sU is deﬁned in Equation (A21).

































g (rh − rl)
R0 . (A23)
By inspection, Equations (A22) and (A23) can be jointly satisﬁed if and only if
rl
3qg >r h − rl,
i.e., if and only if the responsiveness condition Equation(5) holds.
Consider next the participation constraints. The entrepreneurs’ expected payoff is always
non-negative, while sU was constructed such that unconstrained investors break even. From
Equation(A15)withθi = θj = g andsi = sC,wehavethattheexpectedpayoffofconstrained
investors is non-negative if
τ












g (rh − rl)

− I1 ≥ 0,
which becomes











g (rh − rl)
R0
. (A24)



























g (rh − rl)
.
32 The left-hand side corresponds to Equation (1) with θi = b and si = sU, and the right-hand side
corresponds to Equation (3) with θi = b, θj = g,a n dsi = sC.
33 The left-hand side corresponds to Equation (3) with θi = θj = g and si = sC, and the right-hand side
corresponds to Equation (1) with θi = g and si = sU.
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Finally, existence of the proposed separating equilibrium requires that there exists no
other—in this case: pooling—offer that can break the separating equilibrium and allows
investors to break even. Analogous to (A21), the zero-proﬁt pooling offer is given by











































g (rh − rl)
R0 . (A25)






3 − qb + qg

+ 3qgqb (rh − rl)










rl − 3qg (rh − rl)
rh − rl
.


































Finally, if the above conditions hold, any candidate pooling equilibrium can be broken by
the separating offers sU and sC, which establishes uniqueness.
Proof of Proposition 4. The argument for why under unconstrained ﬁnance the market for
outsideﬁnance shutsdownatt = 1hasbeengiveninthemaintext.Considernextconstrained
ﬁnance. By Equation (9), if interim type ψ = l weakly prefers to seek outside ﬁnance, then
interim type ψ = h strictly prefers to seek outside ﬁnance. This immediately implies that
we have three equilibrium candidates under constrained ﬁnance: (i) no project has access to
outside ﬁnance, (ii) all three interim types have access to outside ﬁnance, and (iii) only interim
types ψ = n and ψ = h have access to outside ﬁnance. Importantly, there cannot exist an
equilibrium in which only interim types ψ = n and ψ = l have access to outside ﬁnance at
t = 1, and there obviously cannot exist an equilibrium in which only successful projects have
access to outside ﬁnance: Any offer that attracts successful projects also attracts all lemons.
We now consider all three candidate equilibria in turn.
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Equilibrium in which no project has access to outside ﬁnance at the reﬁnancing stage
This is trivially always an equilibrium. If outside investors believe that only lemons seek
outside ﬁnance, the market for outside ﬁnance shuts down completely.
Equilibrium in which all three interim types have access to outside ﬁnance
We ﬁrst characterize outside investors’ rational beliefs, which we denote by π(ψ).I nt h e
proposed equilibrium, there is exactly one project seeking outside ﬁnance in every state
of nature.34 With probability τ2qθiqθj , both projects have interim type ψ = h. Hence, the
conditional probability that the project seeking outside ﬁnance has interim type ψ = h is
π(h)= τ2qθiqθj . Likewise, with probability 1 − τ2, at least one project has interim type
ψ = n. The conditional probability that the project seeking outside ﬁnance has interim type
ψ = n is thus π(n)= 1 − τ2. Finally, with probability τ2(1 − qθiqθj ), at least one project has
interim type ψ = l and no project has interim type ψ = n. The conditional probability that
the project seeking outside ﬁnance has interim type ψ = l is thus π(l)= τ2(1 − qθiqθj ).35
Given these beliefs, the zero-proﬁt repayment D required by outside investors is
D =
I2
τ2qθiqθj ph + τ2(1 − qθiqθj )pl + (1 − τ2)pn
. (A26)
The proposed equilibrium exists if (i) interim types ψ = l and ψ = h weakly prefer outside
ﬁnance, and (ii) there exists a repayment D ≤ R satisfying Equation (A26). By our previous
arguments, if interim type ψ = l weakly prefers outside ﬁnance, then interim type ψ = h
strictly prefers outside ﬁnance. Hence, the proposed equilibrium exists if and only if Equation
(A26) and
pl(R − D) ≥ R0 (A27)
hold. Note that condition (A27) implies that D<R . Inserting Equations (A26) into (A27)




plR − R0 − pn

1
qθiqθj (ph − pl) + pl − pn

, (A28)
which implies that for an equilibrium to exist in which all three interim types have access to
costly outside ﬁnance, τ must be sufﬁciently large.36
Equilibrium in which only interim types ψ = n and ψ = h have access to outside ﬁnance
In this equilibrium, there is exactly one project seeking outside ﬁnance if either both
projects have interim type ψ = h, or if at least one project has interim type ψ = n.
Hence, the conditional probability that the project seeking outside ﬁnance has interim
type ψ = l is π(l)= 0, the conditional probability that it has interim type ψ = h is
π(h)= τ2qθiqθj /[(1 − τ2) + τ2qθiqθj ], and the conditional probability that it has interim
type ψ = n is π(n)= (1 − τ2)/[(1 − τ2) + τ2qθiqθj ].





34 If both projects have interim type ψ = n, it is optimal for the insiders to present only one project to outside
investors as the latter would otherwise rationally conclude that both projects are unsuccessful.
35 If one project has interim type ψ = h and the other has interim type ψ = l, it is optimal for the insiders to
ﬁnance the former internally and to present the latter to outside investors.
36 Recall that pn is assumed to be small. If, for example, pn is close to pl, (A28) holds trivially for all τ ≥ 0.
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where
ξ (τ) :=
τ2qθiqθj ph + (1 − τ2)pn
τ2qθiqθj + 1 − τ2
is strictly increasing in τ with limτ→0 ξ (τ) = pn and limτ→1 ξ (τ) = ph.
The proposed equilibrium exists if (i) interim type ψ = h weakly prefers outside ﬁnance,
(ii) interim type ψ = l prefers no reﬁnancing to outside ﬁnance, and (iii) there exists a
repayment D ≤ R satisfying Equation (A29). Hence, the proposed equilibrium exists if and
only if Equation (A29) and
ph (R − D) ≥ R0 >p l (R − D) (A30)
hold.NotethattheﬁrstinequalityimpliesthatD<R .InsertingEquation(A29)withequality














Because rψ := pψR − R0 − I2 > 0f o rψ ∈ {l,h}, the second inequality is violated if
ξ (τ) ≥ pl.G i v e nt h a tξ (τ) is increasing in τ, this implies that τ must not be too large.
On the other hand, given that limτ→0 ξ (τ) = pn and our assumption that pn is small, the
ﬁrst inequality is violated if τ is sufﬁciently small.
Proof of Proposition 5. As in Section 2.2, we ﬁrst derive the entrepreneurs’ continuation
payoffs at t = 1 under constrained ﬁnance. The basic structure of the bargaining game is the
same as in Section 2.2, so we conﬁne ourselves to reporting the equilibrium continuation
payoffs as δ → 0. The main difference to our base model concerns the insiders’ total payoff if
a project is not reﬁnanced by the inside investor. In our base model, this payoff was zero for
projects with interim type ψ = n and R0 for projects with interim type ψ ∈{ l,h}. Now, given
that projects have access to costly outside ﬁnance, the insiders’ total payoff if the project is
not reﬁnanced by the inside investor is λψ := pψ(R − D) for all three interim types, where,
unlike our base model, it now holds that pn > 0. The only exception is when both projects
have interim type ψ = n : As only one project can be presented to outside investors, the
insiders’ total payoff in this case is λn from the project presented to outside investors and
zero from the other project.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which ψi = ψj = n.I fEj isthe last entrepreneur to be bargained
with, Ej and the investor each realize 1
2λn. Consider next the negotiations with Ei,w h o
the investor picks ﬁrst. As the investor can credibly threaten to present Ej’s project to




4λn for Ei and zero for Ej.
Consider next the case in which ψi ∈{ l,h} and ψj = n. By optimality (proof of Lemma
2), the investor bargains ﬁrst with Ei. Moreover, if the negotiations with Ei break down,
it is optimal to present Ei’s project to the outside investors, not Ej’s.37 Hence, the investor
and Ei bargain over the cost savings from using inside funds, rψi − λψi, implying that Ei’s
equilibrium continuation payoff is the sum of siR0 + 1
2λψi and 1
2(rψi − λψi), which equals
siR0 + 1
2rψi. Naturally, Ej’s equilibrium continuation payoff is then 1
2λψj .
37 We assume that if the negotiations with Ei over using inside funds break down, the investor and Ei can
still negotiate over the surplus realized from using costly outside funds. An alternative assumption would
be that the breakdown is ‘‘complete’’ in the sense that any negotiations with Ei are impossible. While the
precise deﬁnition of a breakdown of negotiations affects the form of the responsiveness condition derived
below, our qualitative results do not hinge on it.
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Consider ﬁnally the case in which ψi ∈{ l,h} and ψj ∈{ l,h}. Suppose Ej is the last
entrepreneur to be bargained with. The payoffs now depend on whether the investor has
already used up her funds for Ei. If the investor’s funds have already been used up,
Ej realizes sjR0 + 1






with Ej. If the investor’s funds are still available, Ej and the investor bargain over
the cost savings from using inside funds, rψj − λψj . Consequently, Ej realizes the sum
of sjR0 + 1
2λψj and 1
2(rψj − λψj ), which equals sjR0 + 1












2rψj . Consider next the negotiations between the investor and her ﬁrst pick,
Ei. If the negotiations break down, Ei realizes siR0 + 1
2λψi, and the investor realizes the






2rψj . On the other side, the surplus over
which Ei and the investor bargain is rψi − λψi − 1
2(rψj − λψj ). Hence, Ei’s equilibrium









,w h i c h
equalssiR0 + 1
2[rψi − 1
2(rψj − λψj )].Naturally,Ej’sequilibriumcontinuation payoffisthen
sjR0 + 1
2rψj .
Consider next the issue who is picked to be bargained withﬁrst. Ifψi  = ψj,weknow from
the proof of Lemma 2 that the investor picks the entrepreneur with the higher interim type
ﬁrst. In contrast, if ψi = ψj, the investor picks both entrepreneurs with equal probability.
We thus have the following expected continuation payoffs for Ek, an arbitrary entrepreneur:
1
8λn if ψk = ψj =k = n, skR0 + 1
2rψk if ψk ∈{ l,h} and ψ
j =k = n, 1
2λψn if ψk = n and
ψj =k ∈{ l,h}, skR0 + 1
8(rψ + 3λψ) if ψk = ψj =k = ψ ∈{ l,h}, skR0 + 1
2[rh − 1
2(rl − λl)]i f
ψk = h and ψj =k = l,and skR0 + 1
2λl if ψk = l and ψj =k = h.
Given these expected continuation payoffs, we can, analogous to Equation (3), compute













































































3 − qθi + qθj

+ 3qθiqθj [rh − λh − (rl − λl)]

.
Having derived Ei’s expected payoff at t = 0, we next compute the responsiveness under
constrained ﬁnance when all three interim types have access to costly outside ﬁnance.
Analogous to Equation (4), we obtain the responsiveness from (A31) by setting θj = g and















38 Recall the joint probabilities for interim types (ψi,ψj) stated in the proof of Lemma 2.
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